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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center 
gave up tracking cyberattacks after tracking several hundred thousand 
successful attacks a year for several years.1  In that same year, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) reported that it recorded several million scans of its 
computers every day by potential attackers.2  In the years since, hacking efforts 
have only grown in scale and sophistication.3 
This unprecedented level of espionage helps provide some context for the 
United States’ current intellectual property crisis.  In 2008, the U.S. government 
estimated the loss in economic value from cyberespionage to be upwards of $1 
 
1.  CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS, CYBERCRIME, AND 
CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7–8, 28 (2008). 
2. JOHN ROLLINS & CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33123, TERRORIST 
CAPABILITIES FOR CYBERATTACK: OVERVIEW AND POLICY ISSUES 17 (2007). 
3. Devon Milkovich, 15 Alarming Cyber Security Facts and Stats, CYBINT (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.cybintsolutions.com/cyber-security-facts-stats/ [https://perma.cc/G8A9-7F57] (“The 
cybersecurity industry is rapidly growing every day.”).  “As more specialists join the ranks, more 
malware is being launched than ever before, with approximately 230,000 new malware samples/day.”  
Devon Milkovich, CYBINT, https://www.cybintsolutions.com/author/devon-milkovichbarbri-
com/page/2/ [https://perma.cc/8G6L-3QDJ] (last accessed Feb. 23, 2020). 
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trillion.4  In March of 2018, the United States Trade Representative, who led a 
seven-month investigation into China’s intellectual property theft, found that 
Chinese theft of American IP currently costs between $225 billion and $600 
billion annually.5  Just twenty years ago, such looting could only have happened 
through military occupation.6  Today, China does not need to storm our borders 
and steal our files.  They only need computers and a connection to the Internet. 
In response to this growing problem, the purpose of this note is to advocate 
that the legalization of privatized active defense is a better approach for 
deterring this growing cybercriminal enterprise.  Current deterrence efforts are 
not working.  Maintaining a conservative reading of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA) and telling companies they are only allowed to either 
bolster their defenses7 or turn their concerns over to the government is no longer 
sustainable.8  Companies need more freedom to respond at the point of 
cyberattack to better deter cybercriminals. 
II.  DEFINING AND DISTINGUISHING PRIVATIZED AND PUBLIC ACTIVE 
DEFENSE 
As a first point, it is important to note that the government engages in active 
defense.9  The Pentagon has already come to the conclusion that solely passive 
defense does not provide sufficient protection for military secrets.10  In its 2011 
report entitled The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 
Cyberspace, the DoD openly used the term “active defense” and defined it as 
“synchronized, real-time capability to discover, detect, analyze, and mitigate 
 
4. Alexander Melnitzky, Defending America Against Chinese Cyber Espionage Through the 
Use of Active Defenses, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 537, 566 (2012). 
5. Sherisse Pham, How Much Has the U.S. Lost from China’s IP Theft?, CNN BUS. (Mar. 23, 
2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/23/technology/china-us-trump-tariffs-ip-theft/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/27HW-JTE2]. 
6. Melnitzky, supra note 4, at 566. 
7. Steptoe, The Hackback Debate, CYBERBLOG (Nov. 2, 2012), 
https://www.steptoecyberblog.com/2012/11/02/the-hackback-debate/ [https://perma.cc/76K6-YTYS] 
(arguing that the CFAA’s intended meaning of exceeding authorized access is to prohibit hacking 
back). 
8. Episode 240: If Paris Calls, Should We Hang Up?, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Nov. 18, 
2018), https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/episode-240-if-paris-calls-should-we-hang-
up/id830593115?i=1000424171542 [https://perma.cc/AB7G-WM3U].  Mieke Eoyang notes that 
through her research in the To Catch a Hacker Report, only about 15% of cyber incidents are reported, 
and of those, only 0.3% result in a conviction.  Id. 
9. Lyu Jinghua, A Chinese Perspective on the Pentagon’s Cyber Strategy: From ‘Active Cyber 




10. See id. 
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threats and vulnerabilities,”11 so as “to prevent intrusions onto DoD networks 
and systems.”12  It has been used widely since and was even broadened in the 
most recent report published in 2018.13  Active defense, then, is not as new or 
extreme as some might think it to be.14  The government has already decided it 
is in the nation’s best interests to employ active defense, and that it can do so 
in a way that does not escalate into an international catastrophe.  Accordingly, 
the point of this note is to argue the same could be said for allowing the use of 
active defense in the private sector. 
III.  PRIVATIZED ACTIVE DEFENSE AS EQUITABLE REMEDY 
A primary reason for allowing private companies to “hackback”15 is that it 
is an equitable response.  The American legal system has always provided room 
for people to be able to take action in defending their personal property and 
possessions.16  This is a justification defense—a category of legal defense in 
which something that would usually be considered unlawful is considered 
lawfully justified for moral and/or utilitarian purposes.17  In this case, it feels 
morally wrong to not allow someone to defend their possessions.  It is 
recognized that people have a right to their property, and therefore allowing 
someone to defend their property against theft is the right thing to do.  
Additionally, a great deal of social harm would come if criminals knew people 
were not allowed to resist thieves.  Most importantly, though, for the defense 
 
11. Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, NIST: COMPUTER SECURITY 
RESOURCE CTR. 7 (July 2011), https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/ISPAB/documents/DOD-
Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RU7-SGJM]. 
12. Id. at 6. 
13. Jinghua, supra note 9. 
14. Episode 19: HackBack, MALICIOUS LIFE (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/hack-back/id1252417787?i=1000409163160 
[https://perma.cc/P6BB-662J].  Sam Curry, Cybereason’s Chief Product Officer stated that “there’s a 
cold war online in a very cyber turbulent space and its multipolar. . . .  So I don’t want to see a world 
where everyone feels like . . . it’s a Mexican standoff . . . and someone pulls the trigger.”  Episode 
Transcript: HackBack, MALICIOUS LIFE, https://malicious.life/episode/episode-19/ 
[https://perma.cc/668J-RAM5] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020). 
15. Here, a “hackback” considers any action by the cyber victim that goes beyond purely 
defensive measures.  See Active Defense: It Ain’t ‘Hacking the Hackers’, BRAKEING DOWN SECURITY 
PODCAST (Nov. 18, 2014), https://brakeingsecurity.com/size/5/?search=adhd [https://perma.cc/R9LK-
XVY5].  However, it is important to mention that in considering offensive measures, some consider a 
“hackback” to be inherently more offensive than “active defense.” See id.  For more discussion on 
what type of offensive measure is intended in this note, see infra  Part V. 
16. Justification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw (defining defensive-
force justification as “[a] justification defense available when an aggressor has threatened harm to the 
particular interest that is the subject of the defense—usu. to the actor (self-defense), to other persons 
(defense of others), or to property (defense of property).”). 
17. Id. 
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of property, is that much of the deterrent value for this defense hinges on the 
capacity for instant response, as that is not something law enforcement can 
offer.  As the National Rifle Association (NRA) puts it, “when seconds count, 
the police are only minutes away.”18 
An important underlying point to a justification defense is whether or not 
the defensive action in question actually falls within the established parameters 
for that defense and is in fact justified.  That is ultimately the question here.  If 
privatized active defense were perfectly analogous to defense of property, there 
would be no reason to debate whether or not it can be lawfully justified.  As it 
is, there is extensive debate on this point.  In fact, this is arguably the point of 
disagreement on whether the U.S. should legalize privatized hackbacks.  With 
that in mind, the remainder of this note will argue privatized active defense is 
analogous enough to the equitable rationales for defense of property to merit its 
legalization. 
IV.  THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM ISN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE 
Proper attribution is a core component to satisfying a defense of property 
claim.19  This includes not harming or causing an unreasonable risk of harm to 
innocent third parties.20  Consequently, a victim cannot justify tackling 
someone running down the street if she thinks that person is the person who just 
stole her purse.  She needs to in fact tackle the right person to justify her actions, 
and even then, it could be up to her lawyer and the jury to determine if she 
subjected any other parties to an unreasonable risk of harm (such as if she 
pushed other people out of the way during the chase).21 
Opponents of hackbacking invariably point out that identifying a 
cybercriminal is not nearly so straightforward.  Unlike the physical world, a 
cyber victim cannot simply look and see the person who breaks into her server, 
“runs off” with her data, and then chase down and “tackle” that person.  In 
reality, a cyber victim usually does not even know anything has been stolen for 
weeks or months after the incident.22  Consequently, this can often lead to the 
 
18. Episode 155: Debate with Greg Nojeim and Jamil Jaffer, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Mar. 
19, 2017), https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/debate-with-greg-nojeim-and-jamil-
jaffer/id830593115?i=1000437540885 [https://perma.cc/5W62-9MS8]. 
19. A person may also act in defense of property unless the act creates an unreasonable risk of 
causing harm to innocent third parties.  JOHN KIMPFLEN & KARL OAKES, 86 CORPUS JURIS 
SECUNDUM TORTS § 30 (2019). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Jeremy Rabkin & Ariel Rabkin, Hacking Back Without Cracking Up 11 (Hoover Institution, 
Aegis Paper Series No. 1606), 
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/rabkin_webreadypdf.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LS7D-FYSY].  
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wrongful attribution of a cybercrime to an innocent third party.  Because of this 
heightened risk of subjecting innocent third parties to harm, detractors argue 
hackbacking should not be legalized. 
However, the concern of proper attribution has been dissipating in recent 
years.  In a recent interview, the general counsel for the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British equivalent to the National 
Security Agency (NSA), had this to say about attribution: “I think the idea that 
attribution in cyberspace is somehow this impossible task that we shouldn’t 
even try to get past . . . something that people involved in this area have moved 
away from some time ago.”23  He went on to mention the “recent attributions 
of the GRU generally, the NotPetya attacks, [and] WannaCry [attacks]” are 
evidence that “we’ve demonstrated this can be done.”24  To give another 
government example, in 2016, attribution was “reliable enough for the US 
government to accuse named individuals of a particular attack in the recent 
indictment of Iranian government employees for cyber attacks against US 
banks and an attempted attack on a dam.”25 
Granted, attribution is still not as reliable in cybercrime as it is in the 
physical world.  But given how much it has improved in recent years, 
permitting the vast resources of the American private sector to freely contribute 
to addressing this problem could accelerate the process even more.  For one, 
companies are more motivated to find their attacker because they have more of 
a vested interest in protecting their data than the government does.  They are 
the ones facing the brunt of this harm.26  Additionally, there are simply too 
many attacks for the government to handle.  Permitting the private sector to 
begin actively defending its own intellectual property could provide an 
immense amount of manpower to help attribute these attacks to more and more 
offenders. 
Moreover, it is not as if private security firms are not already doing this.  In 
2014, the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike published a report that included “not 
only external pictures of the Shanghai office building where a [hacking] unit 
 
23. Episode 235: It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s . . . Doug?, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Oct. 14, 
2018), https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/episode-235-its-a-bird-its-a-plane-its-
doug/id830593115?i=1000421889072 [https://perma.cc/S6VA-WC7Y] (noting that the interviewee 
went by codename “Doug” for security purposes).  
24. Id.  The GRU is the “intelligence arm of the Russia’s armed forces.”  S.J., What is the 
GRU?, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-
explains/2018/09/11/what-is-the-gru [https://perma.cc/9VXA-TXZD]. 
25. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 11. 
26. Zach West, Young Fella, If You’re Looking for Trouble I’ll Accommodate You: Deputizing 
Private Companies for the Use of Hackback, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 119, 134 (2012) (“In many cases, 
this intellectual property represents the future of the company; at least one British firm went bankrupt 
after a foreign nation stole their signature technology.”). 
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operated but also photographs and names of individual hackers involved in its 
operations.”27  Mandiant, another firm, published a more detailed report on 
another hacking unit in Shanghai.28  Freely supporting companies in hiring such 
firms would multiply the chances of producing similar results. 
A.  What is the harm, really? 
Despite past or future improvements in attribution, opponents to 
hackbacking would likely still argue that harming an innocent third party is not 
allowable regardless of how unlikely it becomes.29  It is therefore appropriate 
to consider just what exactly is the potential harm an innocent third party faces 
via hackback. 
 In a 2017 debate hosted by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), Greg Nojeim points out to his opponent, Stewart Baker, that a 
third party has no way to tell the difference between a hackback and a standard 
hack or how to tell a “good guy” from a “bad guy.”30  Because of this, a third 
party—Nojeim uses the example of a hospital—may feel attacked and trigger 
its extensive defensive response protocols in response to someone who may 
have good intentions.31 
But Baker points out this argument creates a hypothetical unlike anything 
that would occur in the real world.32  If a system has been compromised enough 
for a hacker to store data on that server, there would be multiple people 
accessing the server on any given day.33  The idea, then, that the person hacking 
back would singularly cause the innocent party to freak out is simply untrue.34  
The bigger problem the hospital should recognize is that their system is 
compromised and therefore being utilized as a pathway for cyber espionage, 
likely by numerous bad actors.35  Baker then points out, that in trying to 
determine the most equitable solution, it seems odd to be more concerned about 
a party whose system is so poorly defended it has become a hub of cyber 
espionage, than for a victim accessing that system attempting to retrieve stolen 
data.36 
 
27. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 10. 
28. Id. 
29. Episode 155: Debate with Greg Nojeim and Jamil Jaffer, supra note 18.  In his final 
rebuttal, Greg Nojeim uses this sentiment to sum up his concerns with Stewart Baker’s position.  Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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Moreover, there are two important underlying problems with Nojeim’s 
example.  Firstly, there is an over-weighing of the privacy concern caused by 
the breach itself.  Secondly, there is the underlying fear that further, direct harm 
to the hospital is inevitably going to be caused because of the breach.  These 
two concerns will be dealt with in turn. 
B. Internet privacy and hackbacking as justified exigent response 
There is a broader Fourth Amendment privacy issue with many anti-
hackbackers’ concerns.  Most importantly, the protection against illegal 
searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment do not extend to private 
actors,37 and most states have not passed laws providing further protection.38  
Thirty-seven states allow the recording or “interception” of private 
communications at the consent of one party to an exchange; only twelve states 
require the consent of both parties.39  There is, then, no inherent Fourth 
Amendment bar to a private investigator searching the property of a third party 
in hopes of tracking down his primary suspect.  Of course, this does not mean 
this behavior could not run afoul of other laws (such as breaking and entering) 
but serves to show that the third party’s interest, if breached by a private party, 
is not as protected as one may expect. 
Further, even if the search was being conducted by government actors, they 
are allowed to search a third party’s property if there are “exigent 
circumstances.”40  The typical example of this is if officers are in “hot pursuit” 
of a suspect who then retreats into someone’s home.41  The three things courts 
consider to make this determination are (1) if there is a concern of the imminent 
destruction of evidence, (2) the need to prevent a suspect’s escape, and (3) 
safety for both the pursuing officer and the general public.42  Hackbacking 
arguably meets these first two criteria.  Unless private citizens are able to 
respond close to the moment of detecting intrusion, the suspect is likely to 
escape and the evidence of their crime—the stolen data—will disappear with 
it. 
It could be difficult, however, to convince a court that the third criterion 
applies to a hackback.  The type of safety this criterion typically considers is 
physical in nature, and the gap between cyber harms and kinetic harms is, to 
some, too wide to merit emergency action.  There is reason, though, to believe 
 
37. Burdeau v. Mcdowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921). 
38. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Privacy Bailout: State Government Involvement in the 
Privacy Arena, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 597, 607, 609, 610 (2010). 
39. Ciocchetti, supra note 38, at 609–10. 
40. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). 
41. Id. at 310. 
42. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 92 (1990). 
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the current pillaging of American intellectual property amounts to a kinetic 
harm meriting the more proactive approach of a hackback.  As noted earlier, in 
the past, it would require military occupation to steal the amount of material 
currently being stolen through cyber espionage.43 
Consider the following hypothetical: if bombs were dropped on a city’s 
stock exchange at night, so that casualties were minimized, this would be 
considered a use of force by most observers meriting an equally forceful 
response, even if physical backup facilities were promptly available so that 
actual trading was only briefly disrupted.44  But while a cyberattack will not 
result in the destruction of a building, when it occurs repeatedly and 
continually, so that trading is disrupted for months or years, the resultant 
economic harm is arguably far worse than the destruction of a building.45  A 
forceful response, then, to intensive, chronic cyberespionage, may be 
warranted. 
Or even if a judge is unwilling to equate a primarily economic harm with a 
physical harm, the Stuxnet incident has already shown that a cyberattack can 
be used to inflict physical harm.46  Moreover, the booming industry of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) is heightening concern that physical harms inflicted by 
cyberattacks will soon have grave consequences for the American public.47  
Bruce Schneier focuses on this in his book, Click Here to Kill Everybody, 
arguing that as the IoT becomes more and more pervasive, it is only a matter of 
time before regulatory agencies have to crack down on innovation in response 
to a wrongful death suit.48 
Finally, there is no precedent for whether or not the exigent circumstances 
doctrine applies to a hackback because no court decisions have been made 
regarding the legality of a hackback.49  But considering the points just made, 
there is reason to think a plaintiff-friendly court may believe a third party’s 
 
43. Melnitzky, supra note 4, at 566. 
44. Id. at 566–67. 
45. Id. at 567. 
46. Josh Fruhlinger, What is Stuxnet, Who Created It and How Does It Work?, CSO (Aug. 22, 
2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3218104/malware/what-is-stuxnet-who-created-it-and-
how-does-it-work.html [https://perma.cc/86R5-M926] (providing that Stuxnet was a malicious 
software designed to cause centrifuges in Iran’s nuclear facilities to explode).  
47. BRUCE SCHNEIER, CLICK HERE TO KILL EVERYBODY: SECURITY AND SURVIVAL IN A 
HYPER-CONNECTED WORLD 5–8 (2018). 
48. Episode 230: Click Here to Kill Everybody, THE CYBERLAW PODCAST (Sept. 9, 2018), 
https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/episode-230-click-here-to-kill-
everybody/id830593115?i=1000419482170 [https://perma.cc/HH4A-FWT5].  Bruce Schneier makes 
note of the fact that currently the brakes on some cars can be cut off by remote.  Id.  He further argues 
that it only seems like a matter of time before someone hacks this technology and loss of life occurs.  
Id. 
49. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 14–15. 
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privacy interest is outweighed by the public safety interest of deterring growing 
cyber harms.  But, either way, the freedom granted to private actors in 
conducting third party searches bodes well for the legality of allowing private 
security firms to procure identifying information from third-party servers. 
C. Licensing private professionals to limit collateral damage 
Beyond the privacy issue, the other problem with arguments like Nojeim’s 
is that they assume those who hackback are not going to be able to retrieve their 
data or cease the spreading of that data to other parties, without inflicting further 
harm on intermediaries.  This is a valid concern, and why this note would argue 
that the safest way to implement hackbacks in the private sector is to confine 
private companies to a set list of qualified security firms to do the job.50  These 
professionals would be at least as qualified, if not more so, than a company’s 
internal staff and certainly more qualified than the law enforcement officials to 
whom they are currently told to turn over their cybersecurity issues.51 
It is not as if this is anything new.  As Stewart Baker puts it in a 2012 
hackbacking debate, “allowing private counterhacking does not mean reverting 
to a Hobbesian war of all against all.  Government sets rules and disciplines 
violators, just as it does with other privatized forms of law enforcement, from 
the securities industry’s FINRA [Financial Industry Regulatory Authority] to 
private investigators”52 
This is an important clarification.  Without the oversight of licensing 
agencies, the comparison between hackbacking and defense of property would 
break down.  Justification defenses only work when there are regulatory bodies 
in place who can prosecute those who go beyond the boundaries of sanctioned, 
justified behavior.  In regards to the defense of property, this keeps people from 
going to extreme and immoral lengths when taking defensive action.  Regarding 
hackbacks, licensing agencies are necessary to ensure that companies do not 
use excessive measures and potentially start a war. 
An additional reason to allow companies to hire private security firms to 
hackback is that multiple Fortune 500 companies have already installed active 
defense software on their systems, out of frustration with the current legal 
landscape’s inability to offer them sufficient protection.53  Baker mentions that 
 
50. Id. 
51. Episode 240: If Paris Calls, Should We Hang Up?, supra note 8.  Aside from the woeful 
conviction rates, Mieke Eoyang also notes that she has spoken with companies who properly attributed 
an attack, handed it to the authorities, and nothing was done about it.  Id. 
52. Steptoe, supra note 7. 
53. Ruperto P. Majuca & Jay P. Kesan, Hacking Back: Optimal Use of Self-Defense in 
Cyberspace 5–6 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Papers Series, Research Paper No. 08-20, 2009), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1363932 [https://perma.cc/7AUD-AH33] (“[A] 
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this sort of widespread unregulated use of active defense software is concerning 
and could lead to the “Hobbesian war.”54  The U.S. would be wise to quickly 
take steps to channel these privatized defensive efforts into the hands of 
qualified professionals. 
As a final point on attribution, there comes a point in considering an 
equitable remedy where the potential harm caused needs to be weighed against 
the harm it deters.  In this case, with the current improvements in attribution, 
bolstered by the resources of the private sector, and considering that licensed 
professionals will inflict minimal collateral harm in searching through a third 
party’s system, the harm of hackbacking is sufficiently minor in comparison to 
the immense harm it deters.  Even obvious physical crimes are subject to error 
and wrongful convictions, but a certain amount of error is allowed for the 
greater good of society.55 
V.  POTENTIAL FOR ESCALATING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
Perhaps the most pointed objection to privatized hackbacking is allowing 
private actors to involve themselves in conflicts with other nation-states.56  
There is concern that once provoked, these nations “may assume that any attack 
of any kind can be blamed on the US government and impose retribution on a 
larger segment of American society . . . .”57  If anything, hackbacking 
opponents would argue provoking entire nation-states heightens the risk of 
harm to innocent third parties to an unjustifiable level.58  This is no longer only 
putting the few people at risk who happen to be in the way of apprehending a 
thief; this is putting the entire country at risk. 
The issue with this concern is that it either assumes an unregulated version 
of hackbacking in which unqualified citizens are the ones prying into other 
nation’s systems—something which no serious proponents are advocating59—
or it assumes private security firms are not as qualified as government officials 
to hackback without starting a war.  Again, the government is already 
employing active defense,60 so there is already a belief that its deterrent value 
 
survey of 320 Fortune 500 corporations revealed that around 30% of the companies have installed 
software capable of launching counterattack measures.”). 
54. Id. at 7. 
55. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 11. 
56. Episode 155: Debate with Greg Nojeim and Jamil Jaffer, supra at note 18.  Jamil Jaffer 
makes the point that allowing private security to conflict with international actors is like allowing the 
stereotypically incompetent mall cop to engage in international diplomacy.  Id. 
57. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 12. 
58. Episode 155: Debate with Greg Nojeim and Jamil Jaffer, supra note 18. 
59. Steptoe, supra note 7; see also Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 10. 
60. See generally Jinghua, supra note 9. 
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is worth the risk of international provocation.  The concern is if private actors 
are capable of toeing the line between deterrence and provocation. 
The problem, though, is that there are already examples of private security 
firms hacking into opposing international systems without starting a global 
conflict.61  Moreover, it is hard to see how a private firm could be more 
provocative than the NSA is.62  
However, an important distinction comes up at this point, between 
retrieving data and halting its proliferation.  While the NSA is confined to data 
retrieval, the idea behind hacking back is to take steps to ensure that the data is 
not only retrieved but that the bad actors are prevented from distributing it 
further.  This is where concern arises that hackbackers would employ 
disproportionately harmful tactics in attempts to teach the enemy a lesson.  
Earlier it was mentioned that privatized active defense is preferable because 
these companies have more of a vested interest in protecting their data.  This 
same benefit could be a detriment, as more invested security firms could want 
to inflict punishment on the perpetrators beyond that of an impartial 
government official. 
The answer to this lies in the fact that arguably the best deterrent for hackers 
is not extreme physical force, such as implanting malicious malware capable of 
frying their computer or the entire network of which it is a part, but in exploiting 
their anonymity.63  For one, destroying a hackers’ computer or software is 
readily replaceable.64  This is like trying to deter terrorists by destroying readily 
replaceable vehicles instead of going after the terrorists themselves.65  The more 
effective deterrent is focusing on the cyber attackers by undermining their 
anonymity.66  This is especially the case for the U.S.’ primary opponents, China 
and Russia, for whom much weight is given to maintaining secrecy around how 
their governments operate and how their senior officials live.67  Moreover, this 
creates a helpful asymmetry for the U.S., as the highly public nature of our 
government and business operations means disclosure is generally a much 
bigger threat to our opponents than to U.S. firms.68 
 
61. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 10. 
62.  David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, N.S.A Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security 
Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-
chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html [https://perma.cc/P3GE-KK5U]. 
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Regarding the execution of this, it could be sending a message to the 
opposing hacker saying: “We have learned a lot about you by probing your 
email and your computerized records, your finances, personal whereabouts, 
typical tactics and past victims.  If you do not immediately return the stolen 
data and delete it from your servers, we will post some of this information on 
public websites in retaliation for your attacks on American corporations.”69  
Coupling this sort of action with the vast resources the private sector could 
bring to the attribution problem could rapidly shrink the pervasive anonymity 
within which cybercriminals currently operate.  This, in turn, could lead to a 
marked decrease in cybercriminal activity, as countries like China or Russia 
would likely reach a point at which their discomfort with the disclosure of their 
internal operations would force them to cut back on their hacking initiatives.  
Admittedly, this may not do much to halt the proliferation of the data for the 
first few companies who try it.  Currently, foreign nations do not have much 
confidence that America will actually take retaliatory action for hacking.70  This 
sentiment would fade, however, once nations realize these are not empty 
threats. 
These sorts of threats are, of course, provocational.  Perhaps more limited 
language would be what the licensing agencies agree upon.  Again, it would be 
up to the regulators and not the private actors to decide what kind of offensive 
action is appropriate.  The broader point is that firms would not need to engage 
in overtly kinetic harm to shift from purely data retrieval to the halting of data 
proliferation.  Exposing hackers’ anonymity could itself be a sufficient 
deterrent to slow the growing cybercriminal threat. 
VI.  LEGALIZING HACKING BACK WITHIN THE CFAA 
A final point to consider is whether or not hacking back is clearly illegal 
under the CFAA.  While there have not been any prosecutions on this topic, 
even those in favor of hacking back have granted it is a risky proposition to 
encourage private actors to hackback under the current legal regime.71  There 
is, however, a clear way within the CFAA to legalize hacking back without 
having to draft new legislation. 
Subsection (f) says the CFAA “does not prohibit any lawfully authorized 
investigative, 
 
69. Id. at 3. 
70. West, supra note 26, at 134.  “Some believe that the U.S. government’s cyber-deterrence 
strategy does not work because foreign hackers know that the U.S. will not respond to cyber-espionage. 
However, if U.S. companies openly exercise their ability to hackback, foreign hackers might think 
twice about attacking U.S. systems.”  Id. 
71. Episode 155: Debate with Greg Nojeim and Jamil Jaffer, supra note 18; see also Rabkin & 
Rabkin, supra note 22 at 15.  
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protective or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the 
United States, a 
State or a political subdivision of a State, or of any intelligence agency of 
the United 
States.”72  It is entirely plausible for federal agencies to read this as allowing 
private security firms to be “lawfully authorized” to engage in “investigative, 
protective or intelligence activity.”73  This was the case in 2004 when the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) “authorized a U.S. Air Force cybersecurity team 
to hackback when two hackers infiltrated the computer networks of Rome Labs 
in Upstate New York.  The military does not necessarily fall under section 
1030(f), so the DOJ had to expand section 1030(f)’s protections to a new 
entity.”74  Moreover, since the 9/11 attacks, there “is a growing comfort with 
private actors handling sensitive national security tasks.”75  Ultimately, then, 
the collaboration between the public and private sector discussed to this point 
could, if desired, fit squarely within the CFAA.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
People are breaking into American computer systems literally thousands of 
times per day and running off with billions of dollars’ worth of property.  While 
comparing hackbacking to defense of property has its limitations, the equitable 
considerations it highlights provides a helpful backdrop for why, in view of the 
scope of the current harm caused by cyberespionage, hackbacking is a viable 
option.  The law has long recognized the need to allow the private sector to 
defend itself against harms for which either law enforcement or the courts 




72. 18 U.S.C. §1030(f) (2018) (emphasis added). 
73. Rabkin & Rabkin, supra note 22, at 15. 
74. West, supra note 26, at 142. 
75. Id. 
